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NOTES

An Implied Cause of Action Under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act

Christopher L. Sagers
INTRODUCTION

John and Janet lived for most of their early years together in a
townhouse in Manhattan. It was a rental, a two-story walk-up on
the Upper West Side with barely enough room for the two of them,
and it ate up most of their income so that they were barely able to
save anything. "Wait a minute," John said one day, "we're paying
almost as much for this dump as we'd pay for a mortgage on a nice
house!" So the two of them looked over their finances. Not much
there. A few thousand and a 401(k) at Janet's work. So John and
Janet went to a bank - the Shady Bros. Mortgage & Loan, up in
Westchester. They were going to need a mortgage loan.
The house they picked out, like most mortgaged properties, was
subject to various tax and insurance obligations.1 When borrowers
fail to meet these kinds of obligations, foreclosure is often an inade
quate remedy for the lender because the property may be subject to
liens superior to the mortgage.2 For this reason, Shady Bros., like
most real estate lenders, required John and Janet to make periodic
deposits into an escrow account, from which charges like the tax
and insurance payments could be paid.3 The account, like most
such accounts, was a savings account, the interest on which the
bank retained.4
1. Lenders typically require mortgagors to meet two obligations: casualty insurance pre
miums, intended to protect the lender's interest in the mortgaged property against physical
damage, and local real estate taxes. See D. BARLO W BURKE, JR., LAw OF FEDERAL MORT
GAGE DOCUMENTS § 5.1 (1989); GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW§ 4.17 (2d ed. 1985); Ronald H. Jarashow, Comment, The Improper Use of Tax
and Insurance Escrow Payments by Mortgagees, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 102, 102 (1975)
(describing the mechanics of escrow accounts).
2. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1,§ 4.17. Most importantly, state and local tax
obligations will override any interest of the mortgagee. See id.
3. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 4.17; GEORGE E. OSBORNE ET AL., REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW§ 4.18 (1979) (describing the mechanics of escrow accounts); JAE K.
SHIM ET AL., DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE 104 (1996).
4. See JOHN E. CR!BBET & CORWIN w. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
170-71 (3d ed. 1989) (describing escrow account procedures and mortgage transactions gen
erally); Jarashow, supra note 1, at 102-04 (detailing the development of escrow accounts and
their abuse); Kevin J. Skehan, Note, Enforcement of the Federal Limitation Requirement on
Advance Deposits in Escrow Accounts and the Potential Impact on Mortgage Lenders in Con
necticut, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 789, 791-93 (1992) (same).
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Escrow account programs like the one at Shady Bros. first ap
peared in the 1930s, at a time when widespread poverty and insol
vency led thousands of banks across the nation to adopt similar
protections.5 Over the years, these accounts developed into a lucra
tive source of interest-bearing capital for mortgage lenders.6 The
practice went virtually unnoticed until the late 1960s, when borrow
ers in various states began to challenge the practice alternately as a
violation of the Truth in Lending Act,7 the antitrust laws,s and com
mon law fiduciary duty, usury, fraud, and other doctrines.9 When
the consumer protection movement of the 1970s finally spurred
Congress to enact legislation in this area, it passed the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 ("RESPA").10 RESPA gener
ally limits the ability of lenders to make certain kinds of charges
and imposes on them an array of disclosure requirements.U Sec
tion 10 of the Act limits the amount that a lender may require a
borrower to deposit in an escrow account.12
5. See Thomas H. Broadt, Comment, The Attack Upon the Tax and Insurance Escrow
Accounts in Mortgages, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 352 (1974); Skehan, supra note 4, at 791-93.
6. See Broadt, supra note 5, at 352.
7. 15 U.S.C.§§ 1601-1693 (1994). See Foster v. Maryland State Sav. & Loan Assn., 369 F.
Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1974); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 365 F. Supp.
975 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Munn v. American Gen. Inv. Corp., 364 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Stav
rides v. Mellon Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
8. See Kinee, 365 F. Supp. 975; Munn, 364 F. Supp. 110; Umdenstock, 363 F. Supp. 1375;
Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1973); Stavrides, 353 F. Supp.
1072.
9. See, e.g., Munn, 364 F. Supp. 110; Umdenstock, 363 F. Supp. 1375; Stavrides, 353 F.
Supp. 1072.
10. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2221 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17
(1994)). Congress's first response to consumer rights advocates was to direct the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the Veterans' Administration to study
the problem of excess settlement costs. See Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 461 (1970); Dale A. Whitman, The Real Estate Settlement P rocedures Act:
How to Comply - Problems and Prospects, 4 REAL EsT. L.J. 223, 223-24 (1976). On the
basis of this study, Congress enacted RESPA as a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
mortgage lenders. See id. at 224-25.
11. For example, RESPA requires lenders to provide borrowers with a "uniform settle
ments statement," which sets forth a statement of costs and other information, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 2603 (1994), and to disclose to borrowers any transaction involving sale or servicing of
mortgage loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994).
12. Specifically, section 10 prohibits escrow payments greater than necessary to cover
required expenses plus a "cushion" calculated according to a statutory formula. See 12
U.S.C.§ 2609(a) (1994). This provision may be violated either by requirements that are sim
ply in excess of the permitted amount, or by improper accounting methods. For instance,
mortgage lenders commonly use a means of accounting known as "individual item analysis,"
by which the lender deposits escrow payments into several subaccounts for each type of pay
ment required by law (for example, one for taxes, one for insurance, etc.). Thus, the lender
attempts to keep each subaccount at the level permitted by RESPA, making detection of the
illegal overcharge quite difficult. See ATTORNEYS GEN. OF CAL., FLA., IowA, MASS., MINN.,
N.Y., & TEX., OVERCHARGING ON MORTGAGES: VIOLATIONS OF 11iE ESCROW ACCOUNT
LIMrrs BY 11iE MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY 7-12 (1990) (discussing the nature and preva
lence of individual item analysis) [hereinafter ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT].
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So, about six years after John and Janet bought the house, they
decided they needed a home equity loan to do a little remodeling.
But when they visited John's cousin for a little legal advice, she no
ticed something very peculiar in the couple's first mortgage: it
seemed that they were paying too much for the tax and insurance
escrow - way too much. They had always grumbled about that
tedious bill, but in the face of their tremendous mortgage payment
it had hardly seemed worth complaining about.
In many cases, of course, the individual overcharge may be com
paratively small. The escrow payment, even when illegally inflated,
will still normally represent only a fraction of the overall cost of
mortgage financing.13 The fact remains, however, that banks that
violate section 10 engage in a practice harmful to consumers that
Congress has determined should be unlawful. Moreover, whatever
the impact . on individual consumers, escrow accounts nationwide
now represent a huge store of mortgage consumers' funds,14 wrong
ful manipulation of which can result in harms of national scope.15
13. In several recent class action settlements, individual payouts have ranged from
around $300 to over $1000. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Truth and Mortgage Escrow Statements,
WASH. Pos T, Feb. 5, 1995, at H2.
14. While it is not known how much of the funds held in escrow accounts nationally are
held illegally, it is clear that the numbers are enormous. HUD has estimated that 88% of
mortgage lenders overcharge on escrow payments. See id. In one recent and highly publi
cized class action settlement, a sole defendant, SunTrust Banks Inc., was alleged to hold more
than $7 million in illegal funds, see Jack Snyder, SunTrust Denies Charges, ORLANDO SENTI
NEL, Feb. 10, 1995, at B6, and settled the action for $2.3 million, see Jerry Jackson, Mortgage
Funds Promised to 40,000, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 1996, at Dl. In another recent
settlement, Burnett Banks of Jacksonville returned $11.4 million to over 140,000 mortgagors.
See id.
In 1973, the General Accounting Office prepared a study of escrow accounting practices
in which it found that total escrow account holdings totaled $9.4 billion annually. If escrow
payments are collected monthly and disbursed annually, and if homeowners earn the pass
book rate of five percent without compounding, the profit to borrowers on the above amount
would be roughly $235 million per year. See Broadt, supra note 5, at 352 (discussing the
impact of escrow requirements) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A STUDY OF THE
FEASIBILITY OF ESCRO W AccoUNrS ON RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES BECOMING INTEREST
BEARING 7 (1973)); Charles A. Pillsbury, Note, Lender Accountability and the Problem of
Noninterest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 54 B.U. L. REV. 516, 517 n.7 (1974).
15. Instability in the housing industry can cause severe macroeconomic harms in the
United States. Declines in new housing construction result in widespread shutdowns in the
building industry and curtail activities in related industries. See KENNEIH T. RosEN, AF
FORDABLE HousING 61, 77-78 (1984) (discussing macroeconomic effects of weaknesses in the
housing industry). Housing finance costs, in tum, play a direct role in such declines-de
mand for new housing has been shown to be quite price elastic. See id. at 75-76 (summarizing
econometric study of demand for new housing), primarily because housing starts are over
whelmingly dependent on the costs and availability of mortgage financing. See Leo Grebler
& Sherman J. Maisel, Determinants of Residential Construction, in IMPACTS OF MONETARY
PouCY 475, 491 (Commission on Money and Credit ed., 1963) (finding that a range of eco
nomic research showed "that short-run fluctuations in residential building have resulted
mainly from changes in financial conditions labeled as ease of borrowing, availability of
mortgage funds, or supply of mortgage credit"); see also id. at 532-33, 536-37 (explaining the
importance of including a "credit variable" in econometric models of the housing market).
Thus, if demand for new housing is highly price elastic, then small increases in the cost of
mortgage credit will cause comparatively large decreases in housing starts. Therefore, even
·
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Unfortunately for John and Janet, and millions of home loan
borrowers like them, section 10 is silent with respect to the remedy
for a violation of the escrow payment limitation.16 Therefore, bor
rower plaintiffs must argue that courts should recognize an implied
cause of action under that section.17 Unfortunately for consumers,
federal courts of appeals disagree as to whether such a private ac
tion exists.1s
This Note contends that consumers should have a private dam
ages action under section 10. .Part I discusses the method federal
courts currently employ to determine whether a private cause of
action should be recognized under a given federal statute. Part II
applies this standard to section 10, and it argues that, although the
federal courts currently exhibit a fairly restrictive attitude toward
implication of remedies, an action should be. implied under section
the comparatively small overcharges associated with home mortgage escrows will discourage
those consumers who are otherwise at the margin - presumably, low- and middle-income
families - from purchasing homes. The Congress that enacted RE SPA was fully apprised of
the potential macroeconomic impacts of excessive settlement costs. See S. REP. No. 93-866,
at 13 (1974) (additional views of Sen. Proxmire) ("In many cases, high settlement charges
have depressed the housing market by making it impossible for moderate income families to
afford to purchase a home.").
16. Typically, borrowers seek a remedy in the form of a civil suit for money damages in
the amount of the overcharge. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171 (8th
Cir. 1995). Section 10 actions are usually brought along with several other causes of action
based on the wide range of legal constraints placed on lenders. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Litton
Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298 (5th Cir. 1995) (section 10 claim brought along with actions
under RICO and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act); Al·
lison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1982) (state consumer protection statute); Katz
v. Bank of Cal., 640 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1981) (Truth in Lending, and RE SPA claims other
than section 10); Vega v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 622 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1980) (same);
Adamson v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 677 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1987) (RICO, Truth in Lend·
ing, and breach of contract claims). Section 10 actions have also frequently been brought as
class actions by one borrower plaintiff as a class representative, see, e.g., Herrmann v. Merid·
ian Mortgage Corp., 901 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Lake v. First Nationwide Bank, 900 F.
Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Michels v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 4-93-1167, 1994 WL 242162
(D. Minn. Apr. 13, 1994), or by a governmental entity as parens patriae, see, e.g., Litton, 50
F.3d 1298.
17. See, e.g., Litton, 50 F.3d at 1300; Allison, 695 F.2d at 1087; Vega, 622 F.2d at 925 n.8.
18. The Sixth Circuit recognizes an implied cause of action. See Vega, 622 F.2d at 925 n.8.
The Fifth Circuit, see Litton, 50 F.3d at 1301, and the Seventh Circuit, see Allison, 695 F.2d at
1091, explicitly reject the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, and the Eighth Circuit, although it has not
yet ruled on the issue, has expressed doubts concerning whether a cause of action exists, see
DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1177.
One federal district court in the Third Circuit addressed this issue tangentially. See Lake
v. First Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Lake highlights the irony of the
refusal to recognize a section 10 cause of action. The implication issue arose in Lake in the
context of a class action settlement motion. The court, relying primarily on Allison, ex
pressed serious doubt that the plaintiffs could succeed on their section 10 money damages
action. See 156 F.R.D. at 627. The court accepted the settlement, however, explaining that
the very weakness of the plaintiffs' claim gave the settlement greater force. This was so, the
court continued, because the settlement would deter the defendant bank from future section
10 violations. See 156 F.R.D. at 627-28. As this Note argues in great detail, the courts could
bring about this same deterrence in all cases merely by giving effect to Congress's manifest
purpose and recognizing an implied action under section 10.
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10 because RESPA was enacted at a time when Congress relied on
a more permissive judicial implication doctrine. Finally, Part III
contends that a private action for money damages is superior to
other potential forms of enforcement.

I.

IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES

Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has issued several opin
ions curtailing the power of the federal courts to fashion innovative
remedies, even when to do so would further the interests Congress
sought to protect. Thus, if RESPA were enacted in its present form
today, a claim for an implied cause of action would probably fail.19
However, the Court has recognized that the doctrine of implied ac
tions was quite permissive for many years prior to the conservative
turn of the 1970s - some time after RESPA's passage. At the time
Congress enacted RESPA, it likely was aware of the Court's prior
precedents. As one commentator noted:
If application of the new stricter test to statutes enacted when Con
gress most likely anticipated that the Court would apply the then
existing, broader approach produces different results on the question
of implied liability, then one of two events must occur to reestablish
the status quo ante: either, sua sponte, Congress must divert its atten
tion from its own pressing legislative priorities to reinstitute the prior
approach ... or the people disadvantaged by this judicially initiated
change in the status quo must bear the costs ... 20
.

The Supreme Court has recognized this problem and, as will be
discussed more fully below, 21has held that, as a general matter, the
law that existed when a statute was enacted is relevant to its inter
pretation.22 This Part therefore summarizes the law of implication
as it existed when RESPA was passed and attempts to synthesize
the various approaches of present-day federal courts interpreting
statutes enacted at that time.
19. When a modem statute is silent with respect to remedy, courts will recognize an im
plied action only in rare circumstances. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
Neither the explicit language of section 10 nor its legislative history mention enforcement in
any way. Thus, it is unlikely that, if section 10 were enacted today, courts would recognize a
private action.
20. Robert H.A. Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the
Court Back to Barak, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 227, 233 (1984).
21. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v.First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.164, 173
(1994) (noting that when construing older statutes, courts may consider the larger legal con
text in which the statutes were enacted if the circumstances so require); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.v. Curran, 456 U.S.353, 378-82 (1982) (holding that statutory
interpretation must proceed with a consideration of the "contemporary legal context" in
which a statute was enacted).
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For most of this century, the leading case on implied actions was

Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby. 23 In that case, the Supreme
Court reasoned that "[a] disregard of the command of the statute is
a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover
the damages from the party in default is implied."24 Rigsby drew
heavily upon British doctrines of implied tort liability based on
criminal statutes. 25 Like the British courts, American courts ad
hered for the most part to the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium
where
there is a right, there is a remedy.26 Therefore, until the 1970s,
courts focused almost exclusively on whether a private cause of ac
tion would serve the purposes of a statute.27
-

23. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). See Ashford, supra note 20, at 24647; Thomas L. Hazen, Implied
Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium - Civil
Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 V AND. L. REv. 1333, 1335 (1980). The doctrine
is much older than Rigsby, however, and has been applied throughout U.S. history. See, e.g.,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("(l]t is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded."). See generally Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 375 n.54 (citing
cases).
24. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39.
25. See 241 U.S. at 40 (citing Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q.B. 1854)). See
generally 9 Lours Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURmES REGULATION 4313 n.284 (1989) (ex
amining British doctrine and early American reliance on it); Hazen, supra note 23, at 1335-36
("Implication of a private remedy based upon penal legislation is an off-shoot of the doctrine
of negligence per se.").
26. See, e.g., Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 3940 (stating ubi jus as rule of decision); cf. Fitzgerald v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 1956) ("Consequently, by implication
[the statute] creates an actionable civil right for the vindication of which a civil action may be
maintained . . . ."); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) ("Since (the
statute] does make 'unlawful' the conduct it describes, it creates such a remedy.");
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[I]n the absence of contrary
implications, . . . a criminal statute, enacted for the protection of a specified class, [creates] a
civil right in members of the class."); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir. 1944)
(arguing that a private action is necessary or the policy of the legislation would go unen
forced); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 24445 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[I]f the . . . public is to be
completely and effectively protected, [the statute] must be construed as granting to injured
investors individual causes of action . . . .");see generally 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 25,
at 4335 {discussing reliance on ubi jus).
27. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975)
{holding that an implied cause of action is appropriate only when it "contains
standards of
conduct that a private action could help to enforce"); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
431-33 (1964) (holding that the "broad remedial purposes" of§ 14(a) of the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934 justified implication of a private action for improper proxy solicitation);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (holding that it was the purpose of the
Safety Appliance Acts to prevent violations of their provisions, whether by governmental
enforcement or by implied action); cf. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 374 ("If a statute was en
acted for the benefit of a special class, the judiciary normally recognized a remedy for mem
bers of that class."); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1977) (refusing to imply a
cause of action when the purpose of the statute was to protect a class other than the one to
which the plaintiff belonged); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (implying an action
directly under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; "[W]here federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief.").
• • •

. . •
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A gradual redefinition of this standard began in the early 1970s
amid growing dissatisfaction felt by certain members of the Court
with existing standards for implied actions.2s The Court's discon
tent came to an apparent head in 1975 in Cort v. Ash.29 There a
unanimous Court set forth a four-step inquiry to guide the analysis
of implied cause of action questions.30 Under Cort, courts asked to
recognize an implied action should consider: (1) whether the plain
tiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted; (2) whether there is an indication of legislative intent
to create or deny an implied remedy; (3) whether a private cause of
action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally rel
egated to state law.31 While these factors purportedly did no more
than distill the Court's existing jurisprudence, Cort is understood as
a conservative milestone, marking the Court's clear break with the
more permissive past.32

Cort was nominally the leading implication decision for several
years thereafter, but since it was decided, consensus on the implied
right of action issue has broken down. In the ensuing years, the
Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts should no longer
feel free to provide remedies necessary to give effect to federal stat
utes. The courts instead must fulfill the clearly expressed intent of
Congress, and only in exceptional cases may they look behind the
language of a statute in order to determine that intent.33 Some
have taken these later decisions virtually to end the doctrine of im28.

See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
29. 422 U. S. 66 (1975).
30. See 422 U.S. at 78.
31. See 422 U. S. at 78.
32. See Merrill Lynch, 456 U. S. at 377 (explaining that Cort found that "[t]he increased
complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation strongly sup
ported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent"); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698 (1979) (noting that Cort and cases thereafter instituted a "strict
approach"); Ashford, supra note 20, at 242-43 ("[A] number of jurists have viewed the . . .
four factors in Cort as a restrictive modification" of Borak, 377 U. S. 426, a securities law case
that recognized virtually unlimited federal court power to create new remedies); John A.
Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities Laws: A Historical Per
spective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783, 796 (1980) (characterizing Cort as "reflect[ing] a great
effort to restrain overenthusiasm in inferring causes of action").
33. 1\vo cases decided in 1979 reaffirmed the Court's commitment to literal interpretation
of statutes, as evidenced by its reluctance to imply causes of action, and made clear at the
very least that the Cort standard was to become even more restrictive. See Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding
ton, 442 U. S. 560, 575 (1979) ("[I]n Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it consid
ered 'relevant' in [implying] a private remedy
[But the] central inquiry remains whether
Congress intended to create
a private cause of action."). Thus, when legislative intent is
clear, "there is no need for [courts] to 'trudge through all four of the factors when the dispos
itive question of legislative intent has been resolved. "' Merrill Lynch, 456 U. S. at 388 (quot
ing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
. . • •

. . •
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plication, 34and while it appears that "rumors about the death of the
implied cause of action ...are exaggerated, "35 it is clear that plain
tiffs now must overcome a high hurdle to convince federal courts to
recognize implied private actions.
However, whatever the Court's current attitude toward implied
actions section lO's most important attribute for present purposes is
its age - RESPA was enacted more than twenty years ago. Prior
to the narrowing Supreme Court decisions of the 1970s, Congress
likely expected and relied on the federal courts to imply remedies.
Congress may well have expected the courts to recognize a private
cause of action for violations of section 10 automatically.
While the Court's recent implied action jurisprudence has not
been entirely clear, it has recognized the significance of congres
sional reliance on statutory interpretation precedents, and accord
ingly it has adjusted its interpretive attitude when considering
statutes enacted prior to Cort. In Cannon v. University of Chi
cago, 36 the Court recognized an implied action under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.37 While the Court made clear
that generally it will "adhere to the strict approach followed in ...
recent cases, "38 it explained that such an approach is not appropri
ate for pre-1975 statutes.39 The Court repeatedly emphasized that
Title IX was enacted prior to Cort, and thus that it was necessary to
"take into account [the] contemporary legal context "of the statutes
being construed.40 This is so because "[i]t is always appropriate to
assume that our elected representatives ... know the law, "41 and
therefore "it is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume
that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [pre Cort precedents]
and that it expected [a statute's] enactment to be interpreted in
conformity with them."42 Thus the law relevant to implication
under RESPA is that which existed at the time of its enactment in
1974.43
-

34. See, e.g., Ashford, supra note 20, at 231 ("The continued vitality of these decisions
[concerning the doctrine of implication] is questionable in light of recent significant changes
in the Supreme Court's approach to implied liability . . . . ).
35. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 316 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
37. 20 u.s.c.§§ 1681-87 (1994).
38. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698.
39. See 441 U.S. at 698.
40. 441 U.S. at 698-99.
41. 441 U.S. at 696-97.
42. 441 U.S. at 699.
43. It is worth noting that the "context" rule has gained increasing acceptance in modem
decisions and is now used fairly routinely in contexts beyond that of implied actions. For
example, in Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301 (1992), the question at issue was what was
meant by the term "punitive damages" in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.§§ 26712680 (1994). Section 2674 of that Act expressly prohibits awards of punitive damages against
"

March 1997]

1389

Note - Real Estate

In more recent cases, the Court has reemphasized this "contem
porary context "rule. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 44 while the Court expressed fidelity to its new, conserva
tive focus on facial evidence of legislative intent, it cautioned that
the question of implication should begin with an examination of
Congress's perception of the "contemporary legal context "in which
the statute in question was enacted.45 Similarly, in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 46 while the Court ex
plained that the explicit language of section lO(b) of the Securities
Act of 1934 was sufficiently clear to resolve the issue whether to
expand the existing private cause of action, 47 the Court added that
if the statutory language had not been sufficiently clear, it would
have been appropriate to attempt "'to infer how the 1934 Congress
would have addressed the issue[ ] had the [implied action] been in
cluded as an express provision in the 1934 Act.' "48 Thus, while the
language of a statute is dispositive in the interpretation of modern
statutes, courts must interpret pre-Cort legislation with the "con
temporary legal context "of the statute in mind.49
As mentioned, the jurisprudence of the "contemporary context "
rule has not been as clear as one might prefer. In particular, the
the United States. See 28 U.S.C.§ 2674 (1994). To determine whether the damages sought
by the Mo/zof plaintiff were "punitive," the Court considered the definition of that term in
legal dictionaries in existence at the time the statute was enacted. The Court noted that when
Congress uses legal terms of art in statutes, it is presumed to "'know[ ] and adopt[ ] the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which
it was taken . . . .'" Mo/zof, 502 U. S. at 307 (quoting Morissette v.United States, 342 U. S.
246, 263 (1952)). Similarly, in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501U. S. 775 (1991), an
Alaskan native tribe sued the state of Alaska under a federal jurisdictional statute. The tribe
claimed that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity was no bar to its claim because the
statute implicitly abrogated such immunity. Notwithstanding that only two years earlier the
Court had ruled that "[the] power to abrogate [sovereign immunity] can only be exercised by
a clear legislative statement," 501 U. S. at 786 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491U. S. 223 (1989)),
the Court dutifully considered the state of the law of sovereign immunity at the time the
statute was enacted. See 501 U. S. at 787-88. See generally Nancy Eisenhauer, Note, Implied
Causes ofAction Under Federal Statutes: The Air Carriers Access Act of 1986, 59U. CHI. L.

REV. 1183, 1192-93 (1992).
44. 456 U. S. 353 (1982).
45. See 456 U. S. at 377-82.
46. 511 U. S. 164 (1994).
47. The Court refused to extend further the cause of action that had already been implied

under that statute. Its decision was based on its view that the statute, on its face, made clear
that no such extension was intended. See 511 U. S. at 173-78.
48. 511 U. S. at 173 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U. S. 286,
294 (1993)).
49. This is not to say that a statute's age necessarily resolves the issue
Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U. S. 11 1979), both involved statutes enacted prior to Cort, but the Court refused to
-

recognize implied actions in either decision. While the Court now prefers to make decisions
purely by way of construction of the statutory language itself, however, federal courts still
must look beyond the text of federal statutes to make inferences regarding that text when the
plain language of the statute is unclear.
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few Supreme Court decisions addressing this issue do not explain
whether the standard to be applied to pre- Cort legislation is simply
the law of implication as it existed when the given statute was en
acted, or whether it is some more restrictive standard - for exam
ple, that the analysis proceeds in the same manner as in cases
involving modem statutes, but that "clear on its face " is given a
much more liberal meaning. 50 The problem is complicated by the
fact that in Cannon and Merrill Lynch, the two cases in which the
Supreme Court actually applied the "contemporary context "rule in
its holding, the Court actually considered amendments to statutes
under which implied private actions had been recognized previ
ously. s1 Thus, while the "'relevant inquiry is . . . what [Congress's]
perception of the state of the law was,' "52 it is difficult to say ex
actly what level of proof will be required in order to show that Con. gress intended a statute to be enforced by private action.
II.

AN IMPLIED ACTION UNDER SECTION 10

This Part examines the factors modem courts might consider in
deciding whether to imply an action under section 10. The first and
most important of these factors, discussed in section II. A, is the
statute's language. Currently, courts stress the importance of statu
tory language over other factors as an index of legislative intent,
and some have done so with respect to section 10. 53 Section II. A,
however, argues that evidence contained in the language of section
10 has been exaggerated by those courts that have refused to recog
nize a private action, and that the language itself cannot resolve the
issue. Section II.B considers other factors that might be thought
important. First, it considers the contemporary context in which
RESPA was enacted. Second, it uses the Cort analysis as a conve
nient expedient to capture any residual concerns.
A.

The Language of Section 10

Courts sometimes argue, even with respect to pre- Cort legisla
tion, that the language of a given statute proves with sufficient clar
ity that no action was intended by Congress, and thus that the
inquiry ends with a mere reading of the statutory language. s4 How
ever, even under such a standard the explicit language of section 10
50. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, 511 U. S. at 173; Merrill Lynch, 456 U. S at 375-79.
51. See Merrill Lynch, 456 U. S. at 378; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677,
696-98 (1979). In such a case, the fact that Congress "acquiesces" in the existing enforcement
rules by not overruling them is significant evidence that Congress intends for those enforce
ment rules to remain available. See Merrill Lynch, 456 U. S. at 381-82.
52. Merrill Lynch, 456 U. S. at 378 n.61 (quoting Brown v. G SA, 425 U. S. 820, 828 (1976)).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 54-71.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64.

March 1997]

Note - Real Estate

1391

does not resolve the issue, and should not prevent courts from look
ing behind it to other indicia of legislative intent. In Central Bank
of Denver, the Court held that the statute at issue was sufficiently
clear because it simply did not contemplate the conduct complained
of by the plaintiffs.ss Section 10, by contrast, explicitly prohibits the
conduct at issue in private section 10 actions. In Virginia Bank
shares, Inc. v. Sandburg,s6 the Court went beyond the statute's lan
guage because the text and the legislative history surrounding it
were silent with respect to remedy.s7 Similarly, section 10 is silent,
and its language thus is not dispositive.
Courts that refuse to recognize a section 10 cause of action
sometimes rely on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius that to include one thing is to exclude all others - although they
may not invoke it explicitly. That is, they argue that because some
RESPA provisions provide private remedies and section 10 does
not, Congress must not have intended there to be a section 10 pri
vate action.ss For example, a lender who violates RESPA's notice
and disclosure requirementss9 is liable to the individual borrower in
a private damages action.60 However, in each case in which RESPA
explicitly provides a remedy it provides some unique sort of rem
edy. That is, it explicitly identifies a private remedy in order to
make clear that some unusual sort of relief is appropriate for the
given violation. For instance, plaintiffs who sue under the above
mentioned notice and disclosure requirements are entitled to attor
ney's fees in addition to damages.61 Plaintiffs who allege violations
of either RESPA's kickback or title insurance provisions may sue
for treble damages.62
Some courts make a similar argument with regard to the 1990
amendments to section 10 itself. Those amendments added a re
quirement that mortgagors receive periodic notices regarding the
55. See Central Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S.at 177. The issue there was whether the already
existing implied right of action under section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
could support a suit against "aiders and abettors" of actions prohibited by that statute. The
Court held that "it is inconsistent with settled methodology . ..to extend liability beyond the
scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text." 511 U.S.at 177.
56. 501 U. S.1083 (1991).
57. See 501 U.S.at 1103-05 (considering policy issues as determinative of an implied ac
tion question in a case in which "the Act's text and legislative history[,] mindful of [Con
gress's concern for the protection of the plaintiff class,] reveals little that would help toward
understanding the intended scope of any private right").
58. See Allison v.Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir.1982) ('"Obviously ...
when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so
expressly. "' (quoting Touche Ross & Co.v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 572 (1979))).
59. See 12 U.S.C.§ 2605 (1994).
60. See 12 U.S.C.§ 2605(f) (1994).
61.See 12 U.S.C.§ 2605(f)(3) (1994).
62. See 12 U.S.C.§§ 2607(d), 2608(b) (1994).
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status of their escrow accounts.63 Failure to issue such notices is a
violation of RESPA for which the Department of Housing and Ur
ban Development ("HUD") is authorized to assess a penalty of
fifty dollars per violation. The argument is that by specifically pro
viding a remedy under section 10, but by failing to provide a rem
edy tailored exclusively for violation of the escrow-payment
limitations, Congress implied that no private remedy should be
available for such a violation.64
This argument suffers from two significant weaknesses. First,
the amendments say nothing concerning the more general prohibi
tion on excess escrow payments, which still goes largely unenforced
as a practical matter. The argument, then, apparently rests on the
claim that Congress was more concerned with minor matters of
mortgage administration than with section lO's basic, substantive
prohibition.65 But it seems unlikely that Congress would express its
intent against private enforcement of a statute, that otherwise re
mains useless, merely by addressing a minor, tangential point. Sec
ond, the amendments are silent with regard to private remedies.
They add procedures by which HUD can punish violations of sub
sidiary provisions. It simply does not follow that, by providing
these penalties, Congress expressed any intent with regard to pri
vate enforcement of the substantive provision. The remedies provi
sions currently existing in RESPA are simply irrelevant to the
implication of a private action in section 10.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has, at least on occasion, inti
mated that arguments of this nature should no longer be made. Jus
tice White set out an early exposition of their weaknesses when he
wrote (in dissent):
The Court concludes that because the Act expressly provides for [ad
ministrative] enforcement proceedings, Congress must not have in
tended to create private rights of action. This application of the often
criticized maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius ignores our rejec
tion of it in Cort v. Ash in the absence of specific support in the legis
lative history for the proposition that express statutory remedies are
to be exclusive .66

63. See 12 U. S.C.§ 2609(c) (1994).
See Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen
Congress did amend Section 10
it added penalties for violations of a different provision of
that section but not for violations of the provision limiting escrow deposit accounts.").
65. Section 10 is divided into several subparts. The excess·payment provision is the first
subpart and is titled "In general." 12 U. S.C.§ 2609(a) (1994).
66. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 29 n.6 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
64.

• • .
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Echoing this sentiment, Justice Marshall later wrote for a unani
mous Court that "[we] reject application of the maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. "61
Admittedly, the Court has not consistently followed this rule.68
But even to the extent that Justice Marshall's holding has not been
adopted fully, its reasoning has considerable force. To be sure,
courts sometimes argue that when a statute provides a remedy in
one instance and not another, it should be inferred that Congress
"knew how to provide a remedy when it wanted."69 But this legal
fiction is problematic. After all, Congress knows how to provide a
remedy all the time, and yet courts have implied remedies through
out this century. This suggests that sometimes, although Congress
knows how to provide a remedy, it may have been unable to do so
for reasons of political compromise, it may simply have forgotten to
do so in a given instance,70 or it may have felt that the presence of a
private remedy is sufficiently clear on the face of a statute and that
it was unnecessaiy to spell one out explicitly. As Justice Traynor
put it:
A statute may be dubious because those who sponsored it were not
motivated to do so in the public interest or because those who en
acted it did so without adequate knowledge or consideration of its
objectives or implications. For all the vaunted responsiveness of legis
latures to the will of the people, it is no secret that legislative commit
tees, particularly those dominated by the elder statesmen of a
seniority system, tend to dilute the reliability of statutes as expression
of public policy.11

B.

Other Considerations

If the language of section 10 leaves the question of private en
forcement open, then courts must consider other indicia of legisla
tive intent. Probably the most important of these is RESPA's age.
67. Hennan & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983). See generally 9
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 25, at 4334-36.
68. This is evidenced by the fact that, on occasion, the Court still cites Transamerica and
other decisions based on expressio unius with approval. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
25, at 4334-36.
69. Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1982).
70. For example, Judge Posner argued with respect to section lO's curious silence that
Congress simply may have forgotten to provide a remedy. See Allison, 695 F.2d at 1092-93
(Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). For him the question was whether,
"if the Congress that enacted RESPA had adverted to the question of remedies for violations
of section 10, [it would] have decided that there ought to be a private damage remedy.. .."
695 F.2d at 1092.
71. Hon. Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Com mon-Law Orbits, 17 CATII. U. L.
REV. 401, 424-25 (1968); see also Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 489, 496 (1995) (arguing that Congress is often simply unable to give the courts the
explicit guidance they might desire).
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Thus, this section first considers RESPA's "contemporary legal con
text" - the law of implication as it existed in 1974. Then, in order
to reach whatever other factors courts might consider, this section
concludes by subjecting section 10 to the Cort analysis.
1. The Law in 1974
The law of implication as it existed in 1974 would easily support
an implied action under section 10. Rigsby was still the leading case
at that time, so the basic inquiry was whether the plaintiff was "one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted
...."n The statute in Rigsby was a bare regulatory provision that
made no mention whatever of liability in private civil proceedings.73
However, the mere fact that it was intended to protect that class of
which the plaintiff was a member was sufficient to support a private
cause of action. RESPA has only one purpose: protection of indi
vidual consumers. It is beyond doubt that individual home buyers
are the class for whose especial benefit Congress enacted section
10. The legislative history is replete with references to this effect.74
To be sure, the question of implied private causes of action was
not free from doubt even in 1974. As mentioned above, 75 the
Court's decisions of the early 1970s showed signs of growing discon
tent with implied rights of action.76 Nevertheless, the Court by
1974 had not yet wholly discarded the permissiveness of Rigsby.
72.

Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 {1916).
73. See Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 38-39. The statute at issue was the Federal Safety Appliance
Act, ch. 196,§ 2, 27 Stat. 531, 531 {1893) (repealed 1994), which required railroads to install
safety devices on its railroad cars. The Act was to be enforced by "a penalty of one hundred
dollars for each and every such violation, to be recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by
the United States district attorney . . . ." Federal Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196,§ 6, 27 Stat.
531, 532 (1893) (repealed 1994).
74. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) {1994) (explaining that RESPA's purpose is "to insure that
consumers throughout the Nation . . . are protected from unnecessarily high settlement
charges"); Charles G. Field, RESPA in a N utshell, 11 REAL PROP., PROB. & T R. L.J. 447, 44849 (1976) ("By passing RESPA, the Congress intended that the consumer be given sufficient
information at an early enough time to permit shopping
for the best settlement services
and costs . . . . Congress certainly intended that the abusive practices . . . be eliminated.").
75. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
76. In a handful of cases predating RESPA's enactment, the Supreme Court initiated its
first doubts about the propriety of the Rigsby standard, and thus by 1974, the Court had
begun to cast some doubt on the power of courts to imply private actions. Professors Loss
and Seligman call this period the "back to orthodoxy" stage, which immediately preceded the
"shift of presumption" stage brought about by Cort and later decisions. See 9 Loss & SEuo.
MAN, supra note 25, at 4324. In the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court implied an
action directly under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Harlan concurred, but was somewhat
critical of the Court's apparent belief that the doctrine of implication is merely an innocuous
act of statutory construction. He argued that "[t]he notion of 'implying' a remedy . . . can
only refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally
available judicial remedies" rather than to a mere search for statutory meaning. 403 U.S. at
403 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger went considerably further in his rather
heated dissent, arguing that courts simply are not qualified to decide questions of enforce.

.

•
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After all, Cort itself recognized an implied right of action in the
case of "a bare criminal statute, with absolutely no indication that
civil enforcement of any kind was available to anyone."77 Thus, if
the question had arisen in 1974, section 10 should have passed mus
ter quite easily and a private cause of action been recognized.
The implications of this analysis, as indicated earlier,78 are not
entirely clear. What is clear is that "the contemporary legal con
text" in which RESPA was enacted was considerably more permis
sive than that which exists today, and that fact alone tips the scales
in favor of a private action.79
2.

The Cort Factors

The Cort factors provide a convenient means to analyze
whatever residual concerns may remain after consideration of the
contemporary context. The Cort factors are: (1) whether the plain
tiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted, (2) whether there is an indication of legislative intent
to create a private right of action, (3) whether the private cause of
action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme, and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally rel
egated to state law.80 All of the Cort factors support recognition of
a section 10 cause of action.
Cort first asks whether the plaintiff is a member of the class pro
tected by the statute. This, of course, is merely a restatement of the
ment. "Legislation," he argued, "is the business of the Congress." 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
In cases immediately following Bivens, the Court expressed growing concern with its own
capacity to infer remedies. In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Pas
sengers (Amtrak ), 414 U.S. 453 (1974), decided the same year that RESPA became law, the
Court refused to imply an action on behalf of a national passengers' union against the Am
trak corporation. The Court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the Amtrak Act's history to
conclude that legislative intent precluded a private action. Such an examination stood in
notable contrast to the terse reasoning of Rigsby and its progeny. See also SIPC v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412, 418 (1975) (refusing to imply an action merely because the statute did not
preclude an action, in contrast to a sentiment that had been expressed in earlier cases, like
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947), that "in the absence of contrary
implications . . . a criminal statute, enacted for the protection of a specified class, [creates] a
civil right in members of the class").
77. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975). Similarly, notwithstanding the skeptical minority
views in Bivens, the majority in that case applied a standard arguably as broad as that in
Rigsby. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96 (recognizing an implied private action because "dam
ages [are] regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty
'[I]t is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available
remedy to make good the wrong done."'(citation omitted)).
78. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
80. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
. . • •
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Rigsby standard, and was discussed above.s1 Therefore, the pro
tected-class element of the Cort inquiry is easily satisfied.
The second Cort factor asks whether there is an indication of
legislative intent to create a private action. Like the language of
the statute, section lO's legislative history contains no explicit en
dorsement or denial of a private cause of action. Most courts that
have considered section 10 have held its history to be inconclu
sive.82 The Sixth Circuit - in an unusually unrestrained opinion
for the post-Cort period - suggested in a footnote that the legisla
tive history was sufficient evidence in itself of the implied action.83
The court did not claim, however, that Congress had explicitly man
dated such an action.
RESPA's protective purpose, clearly established by its legisla
tive history, supports recognition of an implied action, even if its
history is silent as to enforcement.84 As Justice Stevens explained
in his opinion for the Cannon majority, when " 'it is clear that fed
eral law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not neces
sary to show an intention to create a private cause of action,
although an explicit purpose to deny such an action would be con
trolling.' "85 That must be the case, or actions would never be
implied.86
Third, Cort requires courts to consider whether the proposed
implied action is consistent with the purpose of the statute. A pri
vate action is consistent with RESPA's purpose because it would
allow consumers themselves to vindicate their rights. An implied
cause of action is the means best suited to serving the purposes of
the statute, and, as will be discussed below, it is the means most
consistent with the attitudes of RESPA's drafters.8 7
Finally, Cort requires that courts consider whether a given cause
of action is properly a matter of state concem.ss Regulation of
81. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
82. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1995)
("[T]here was no legislative history on the issue . . . ."); Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086,
1089 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The parties' briefs, the district court's opinion and our own research
disclose no legislative history on the issue . . . . ).
83. See Vega v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 622 F.2d 918, 925 n.8 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[W]e
believe, based on the legislative history, that Congress intended to create a private remedy
for violations of the Act.").
84. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-866, at 8 (1974) ("[T]his provision will result in substantial
savings to the home buyer at the time of settlement . . . . ").
85. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 82 (1975)).
86. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (remarking
that the silence of the legislative history is "not surprising when it is remembered that the Act
concededly does not explicitly provide any private remedies whatever").
87. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
88. The Supreme Court decisions of the late 1970s deemphasized this criterion and made
clear that a showing that a given area of the law is properly federal is not enough, on its own,
"
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mortgage escrow accounts is not an area traditionally within state
purview. Escrow accounts first appeared in the 1930s and went vir
tually unregulated until the enactment of the RESPA's immediate
federal predecessors in the early 1970s.s9 Only a few states have
enacted laws in this area,90 and those that have take a notably dif
ferent approach than section 10.91 These state statutes have no
common law antecedents. Furthermore, RESPA applies only to
"federally related" mortgages - that is, mortgages made by a
lender that is insured or regulated by the federal government.92 Fi
nally, RESPA explicitly preempts inconsistent state law.93 There
fore, to the extent that state escrow law exists, federal law controls.
Escrow administration, then, is a matter of decidedly federal law.
And thus, in sum, even the comparatively conservative Cort inquiry
strongly supports recognition of an implied cause of action.94
III.

THE SUPERIORITY OF AN ACTION FOR MONEY DAMAGES

This Part seeks to show that public policy favors private enforce
ment. Section III.A argues that if RESPA's escrow rule is to be
given any teeth, the appropriate means to do so is a private action
for money damages. Administrative enforcement or even private
remedies other than a damages action will be inferior. Section III.B
puts forth several final considerations that weigh in favor of a dam
ages action.

to imply an action. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 23-24; Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 515-76 (1979). Those decisions also seem to indicate, however, that in order to imply an
action, this factor, along with all the others, must be satisfied.
89. See Skehan, supra note 4, at 793 (discussing the history of the escrow-account
practice).
90. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-2a (West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 61
(1994); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-b (McKinney 1990).
91. The state statutes that exist place no cap on the amount of escrow requirements, but
instead require that the borrower receive interest for the escrowed funds. See Skehan, supra
note 4, at 790 n.10 {discussing statutes of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York).
92. See 12 u.s.c. § 2602(1) (1994); see also 4 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY <JI 37A.02[2] (1996) (discussing the scope of RESPA coverage).

93. See 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (1994).
94. Some courts refuse to recognize implied actions for policy reasons. For instance, the
Virginia Bankshares court refused to expand liability in the case of section 14(a) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act in part because of the evidentiary difficulties involved - investor
plaintiffs would have to prove purely speculative claims as to the value their securities might
have had if the offending corporate transaction had not occurred. See Virginia Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandburg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1105-06 {1991) (relying on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 742-43 {1975)). No such difficulties are implicated in the case of section
10. Plaintiffs would merely show that the amount required in the mortgage agreement ex
ceeds that required by section lO's statutory formula.
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A. Failure of Alternative Remedies
An implied cause of action for money damages would be unnec
essary if other means of enforcing section 10 were effective. For
example, plaintiffs might pursue private equitable or self-help rem
edies or administrative enforcement might be available. As this
section shows, however, such alternative remedies cannot ade
quately address the needs of mortgage borrowers or achieve
RESPA's goals.
The most viable alternative, administrative enforcement of sec
tion 10, would be inadequate. HUD is the only government entity
likely to hold section 10 enforcement authority. Although not spe
cifically designated to enforce section 10,95 HUD is empowered to
enforce some of RESPA's other provisions96 - although that gen
eral authority is nowhere set out in the statute.9 7 HUD apparently
has no interest in enforcing section 10, however, and it might not
even be empowered to do so. HUD originally took the view that its
authority extended no further than to various of RESPA's disclo
sure provisions - that is, that it had no regulatory jurisdiction
whatsoever with respect to section 10.9s The set of rules initially
enacted by HUD under RESPA, known as "Regulation X," con
tained no rules concerning section 10.99 When HUD did finally ad
dress section 10, after nearly twenty years, its rules contained only
interpretive guidance concerning accounting and administrative
practices.100 The rules do little more than restate and clarify section
10 itself, adding only several statutory definitions101 and certain
95. HUD is given rulemaking and interpretive powers, but no general enforcement
power. See 12 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (1994).
96. RESPA explicitly assigns the following functions to HUD: (1) issuing "uniform set
tlement statement[s]," a form to be used in all transactions involving loans subject to RESPA,
see 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (1994); (2) preparing an explanatory booklet to apprise borrowers of
their rights under RESPA, see 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (1994); (3) promulgating rules concerning
kickbacks and other unearned fees in the mortgage settlement process, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 2607(c) (1994), and prosecuting violations of the kickback rules, see 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (d)(4)
(1994); and (4) administering model land recordation systems in various parts of the United
States on a demonstration basis, see 12 U.S.C. § 2611 (1994).
97. Note the irony: some courts, purportedly wary of inferring legislative intent with re
gard to private enforcement, argue that administrative enforcement is adequate. Administra
tive enforcement authority, however, is nowhere set out in section 10. Such authority,
therefore, must also be implied.
98. See Whitman, supra note 10, at 234 (describing HUD's early hesitancy to exercise its
RESPA rulemaking power in any area except certain cost-disclosure provisions).
99. See id. ("[O]nly [the disclosure] provisions of RESPA . . . are amplified in Regulation
X.").
100. See 24 C.F.R.§ 3500.17 (1996) (interpreting section 10, but setting forth no enforce
ment provisions).
101. See 24 C.F.R.§ 3500.17(b) (1996) (defining numerous statutory terms found in sec
tion 10 and Regulation X, none of which relates to enforcement).
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rules governing acceptable accounting procedures. 102 They make
no mention of enforcement of the escrow limitation.103
Furthermore, RESPA's drafters expressed animosity toward
government expansion, which strongly suggests they intended sec
tion 10 to be enforced by means other than bureaucratic oversight.
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
the committee of jurisdiction over RESPA, made clear its intent to
protect housing consumers without expanding the federal bureau
cracy. 104 RESPA's predecessor, section 701 of the Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970,1 0s required HUD and the Veterans'
Administration to regulate directly the fees imposed in connection
with real estate settlement.106 RESPA repealed these "rate regula
tion" provisions because they required burdensome federal
micromanagement. RESPA further rejected any similar proposed
regulations in favor of less bureaucratic oversight.107
In addition, administrative agencies are simply not equipped to
enforce section 10 as well as private litigants are. Even if HUD
were empowered to enforce section 10, RESPA is only one small
part of HUD's wide range of responsibilities, and section 10 is only
one provision of RESPA.108 The Supreme Court itself raised a very
similar argument to support its recognition of an implied action in
Cannon v. University of Chicago.109 There the Court pointed out
that a private action was necessary to effectuate the purposes of
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 because the De
partment of flealth, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"), by its own
admission, was unable to enforce the statute effectively.no
102. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.17(c)(2)-(4), 3500.17(d) (1996).
103. HUD's rule contains penalty provisions for a subsidiary provision of section 10, con
cerning escrow account statements. See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.17(m)-(n) (1996). These provisions,
however, are virtually identical to the penalty provision contained in section 10 itself with
respect to failure to issue escrow statements. See 15 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (1994). They say noth
ing with regard to violations of the more general escrow limitation itself.
104. See S. REP. No. 93-866, at 4-5 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-1177, at 5 (1974) (heavy
administrative involvement is " 'likely to create a bureaucratic monstrosity"' (citation omit
ted)) .
105. Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 701, 84 Stat. 450 (1970).
106. See S. REP. No. 93-866, at 4-5 (1974) (characterizing the prior legislation).
107. See id.
108. Illustrative of the breadth of HUD's duties is the fact that the body of HUD regula
tions fills seven full volumes of the Code ofFederal Regulations, totaling 4,375 pages. See 24
C.F.R. §§ 0.735-101 to 4100.4 (1996). The sole provision relevant to section 10 takes up only
11 of those pages. See 24 C.F.R. § 35�0.17 (1996).
109. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
110. See 441 U.S. at 708 & n.42. In submissions to the Court in the Cannon proceedings,
HEW admitted that it did not have the resources necessary to enforce Title IX adequately.
HEW wrote that:
As a practical matter, HEW cannot hope to police all federally funded education pro
grams, and even if administrative enforcement were always feasible, it often might not
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Finally, even if HUD were empowered to enforce section 10,
the reach of its authority would be incomplete. At least some mort
gage borrowers would fall through the cracks of administrative en
forcement authority because some lenders covered by RESPA are
not overseen by HUD or any other federal regulatory agency. For
example, a bank may be subject to RESPA's escrow-payment limi
tation because it makes residential loans in excess of one million
dollars per year,111 but not be overseen by any administrative body
with RESPA enforcement authority because it is a private institu
tion that receives no federal insurance protection.112 Therefore,
HUD and other federal agencies, even if they had any intention of
enforcing section 10, could not intercede in cases of RESPA viola
tions by such an institution.
Furthermore, a damages action is superior to alternative private
remedies. Plaintiffs could resort to some sort of self-help style rem
edy, such as simple refusal to make excess escrow payments. If the
lender sought to recover such payments, section 10 could be raised
as an affirmative defense. This self-help action would be taken at
the borrower's peril, however, because the courts might also disap
prove of extrajudicial action on the part of individual borrowers.
Injunctive forms of relief would also be inadequate. Equitable
remedies might be useful if available prior to section 10 violations.
However, if a borrower is able to identify excess escrow require
ments in a financing agreement prior to entering the agreement he
would simply take his business elsewhere rather than seek some
sort of judicial relief. Similarly, postviolation equitable relief would
redress individual injuries. An implied private right of action is necessary to ensure that
the fundamental purpose of Title IX . . . is achieved.
441 U.S. at 708 n.42 (quoting Reply Brief for Federal Respondents 6).
111. RESPA applies only in cases involving a "federally related mortgage loan," as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) (1994). These loans fall into four categories:
(1) those made, in whole or in part, by lenders that are regulated or insured by any
federal agency;
(2) those made, in whole or in part, by HUD or any other federal agency, in connection
with any federal housing program;
(3) those made by any lender that intends to sell them, directly or indirectly, to the
Federal National Mortgage Association or the Government National Mortgage Associa
tion; and
(4) those made by certain private lenders that loan or invest more than $1,000,000 annu
ally in residential real estate.
12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(B) (1994). It is the final class of lenders that is of interest; institutions
falling in this category might go wholly unregulated by any government entity that could
conceivably enforce RESPA.
112. The only possible exception is the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See 15
U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1994) (granting the FTC general authority to enforce the Consumer Credit
Cost Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93 (1994), which governs a range of private lenders).
It is not at all clear, however, that the FTC will ever enforce section 10. See Allison v. Lib
erty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1090 n.8 (7th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that the FTC might have some
section 10 authority over this class of lenders, but noting that it has never used such
authority).
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be of little use because while a court might enjoin the abusive prac
tice, an equitable order would not restore funds already wrongfully
gotten.
B. Why an Action for Money Damages?
A private damages action presents several advantages over
these alternative remedies, particularly over administrative re
sponse. First of all, only a damages remedy will allow plaintiffs to
recover prejudgment interest on the escrowed funds.113 Tue under
lying escrow funds themselves are of no real use to the lender they must be applied toward tax or other obligations, or be re
turned to the borrower. Tue lender's real interest in retaining ex
cess escrow funds is that it is able to retain the interest on the excess
funds. Th.us, merely requiring lenders to return excess funds upon
discovery of a section 10 violation allows them to profit from the
violation and works no penalty. As Judge Posner put it, "[y]ou may
not steal a man's pregnant cow and after it has given birth return
the cow and keep the calf."114 Th.us, a private damages action will
prevent windfalls to lenders and make borrower plaintiffs whole.
Other advantages include the superior ability of private plain
tiffs to monitor their own affairs. A federal enforcer must oversee
many thousands of lenders, whereas the private plaintiff must moni
tor only one. Individual consumers, by contrast, have no interest to
serve but their own, and thus are likely to pursue enforcement more
diligently. Furthermore, private suits spread the costs of litigation.
To be sure, not all mortgage borrowers are well suited to bear the
costs of suit, and some might benefit from an allocation of federal
resources to the extent they exist. But whatever hardship may be
associated with the costs of litigation, private and administrative
remedies are not mutually exclusive: if HUD or some other entity
113. Such awards may be made in conjunction with implied damages remedies even when
the remedy is implied from a statute that does not provide for such interest. See Blau v.
Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962) (citing Board of Commrs. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343,
352 (1939) (with regard to an action implied under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: '"interest is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for
money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness'")); see also Rodgers v.
United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947) ("[T]he failure to mention interest in statutes which
create obligations has not been interpreted by this Court as manifesting an unequivocal con
gressional purpose that the obligation shall not bear interest.").
Interest will generally be awarded unless for some reason it would be unfair. See Anixter
v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549, 1554 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Despite the general availa
bility of prejudgment interest absent some justification for withholding it, federal law does
not make it available as a matter of right."). In particular, awards of interest may not be
punitive in nature - that is, they must be compensatory. See Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1554; Wolf
v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 479 (5th Cir. 1973). Further, prejudgment interest is distinct from
consequential damages based on the lost use of money. Interest merely compensates the
plaintiff for the lost time-value of his money. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233,
238-40 (7th Cir. 1974) (distinguishing between profits of lost investments and interest).
114. Allison, 695 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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does indeed have enforcement authority, the implication of a pri
vate action would not diminish that authority. Federal resources, if
they currently exist to any extent, would still be available to vindi
cate the rights of borrowers unable to bear private litigation bur
dens.115 Furthermore, the hardships of litigation are outweighed by
the loss that the entire class of mortgage consumers generally would
suffer if section 10 were to go completely unenforced - the likely
consequence of refusing to imply a private cause of action. 11 6
But will plaintiffs take advantage of private damage actions if
they are available? Escrow overcharges sometimes may not be
large enough in themselves to motivate litigation.117 Nonetheless,
because escrow violations are often discovered along with other
abuses in the lending process, section 10 claims most commonly
arise in connection with claims of other violations, either under
RESPA itself or under other consumer protection regulations such
as the Truth in Lending Act.118 Moreover, section 10 damages and
the attendant prejudgment interest are not always inconsequential.
Mortgage loans on residential housing tend to be long-term transac
tions; therefore, if a borrower recognizes the overcharge at the end
of a period of many years, the accrued interest could be substantial.
Finally, because section 10 actions are often brought as class ac
tions,119 the potential for class action damages could significantly
defray litigation costs.
Finally, one might argue that the addition of section 10 damages
actions to the overcrowded dockets of the federal courts would
drain already limited judicial resources.120 However, plaintiffs gen
erally bring section 10 claims along with other causes of action for
which there are explicit rights to sue.121 Therefore, the recognition
115. In any event, no allocation of federal resources seems forthcoming, whether to pro
tect mortgagors of limited means or otherwise.
116. In fact, in the absence of private enforcement, section 10 remains largely unused.
See ATTORNEYS GENERAL REPORT, supra note 12, at app. III-2.
117. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 16.
119. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298 (5th Cir. 1995); Herrmann
v. Meridian Mortgage Corp., 901 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Lake v. First Nationwide
Bank, 900 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Michels v. Resolution Trust Corp No. 4-93-1167,
1994 WL 242162 (D. Minn. Apr. 13, 1994).
120. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 409 n.17
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Allison v. Liberty Sav., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (noting that implication of an action
will impose costs on the federal courts).
.•

121. For example, escrow abuses are often challenged under the residential mortgage
disclosure provision of the Truth in Lending Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994). Violation of
that provision gives rise to an action for rescission of the transaction, see 15 U.S.C. § 1635
(1994), and potentially for other relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(g) (1994) (other relief available
as necessary); see also supra note 16.
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of an action in the case of section 10 will likely result in no new
litigation, and little appreciable cost for the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
Consumers should enjoy a private cause of action under section
10 of RESPA. Lenders can effectively ignore borrowers' rights
under section 10 if those rights are left solely to administrative en
forcement. The current refusals of many federal courts to recognize
a section 10 action is thus rather ironic: by stridently refusing to act
without evidence of legislative intent, they seriously frustrate legis
lative intent. This is an unnecessary outcome (of a sort that the
Supreme Court once considered "a monstrous absurdity in a well
organized government" 122), because the statute and the circum
stances surrounding it favor the implication of a private remedy
under current law. A Congress whose express purpose was to "pro
tect [consumers] from . . . abusive practices,"123 and that had for
decades known the federal judiciary to be active in the fashioning
of judicial remedies, would intend for the courts to allow private
litigants to sue.

122. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838).
123. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (1994).

